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Recent Cases
CORPORATIONS-EFFECT OF MERGER OR CONSOLIDATION
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

ON

United States v. United States Vanadium Corporation
While criminal proceedings were pending against each of them, a Delaware
corporation, a West Virginia corporation and a New York corporation merged
with their parent corporation and were dissolved. Thereupon the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the criminal proceedings.
On appeal the Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit affirmed as to the Delaware
and West Virginia corporations but reversed as to the New York corporation.
In view of the proposition that, absent statutory exceptions, a corporation
upon dissolution ceases to exist for all purposes', the court was faced with the
sole problem of determining whether there were statutory exceptions which
would allow the survival of criminal proceedings pending at the time of dissolution.
A corporation may be held criminally responsible apart from the guilt or
innocence of its officers'. A criminal prosecution of a natural person abates upon
his death, and if the analogy of death and dissolution is extended to this
situation along with the tendency of strict statutory construction in respect to
criminal prosecutions', it would seem that there must be either express statutory
criminal provisions or a strong public policy for survival of criminal prosecutions of corporations.
The Delaware "saving" statutes use the terms "suits" in one sentence, "any
action, suit or proceeding" in another sentence' and "any action or proceeding
pending" in still another section'.
The Tenth Circuit in United States v.Safeway Stores.7 had previously held

1. 230 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956).
2. Moss v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Mackland
Inv. Co. v. Ferry, 341 Mo. 493, 108 S.W.2d 21 (1937).
3. United States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 79 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
4. Alamo Fence Company v. United States, 240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957);
State v. Dougherty, 358 Mo. 734, 216 S.W.2d 467 (1949).
5. DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1953).
6. Id. at § 261.
7. 140 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1944). This case also involved the question of
survival of a criminal prosecution of a dissolved Delaware corporation but
differed in that indictments had not been returned prior to dissolution.
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that "suits", as used in one section of the Delaware statute8, does not include
criminal prosecutions. The Sixth Circuit in United States V. Line Material Co.'
said that even though the words "actions, suits or proceedings" are used in
a later sentence in the same section, the dominating term of the section is "suits"
which, taken along with the expressed purpose for prolonging the corporation's
life, means the section refers to matters civil in nature. Moreover, substitution
of defendants is not a characteristic of a criminal prosecution, hence, a civil
proceeding alone is referred to in a section providing for substitution in "any
action or proceeding pending" against corporations consolidated or merged"0 .
However, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. P. F. Collier & Son
Corporation"lheld that even though "suits" and "actions" may reasonably refer
to cases civil in nature, the addition of the term "proceeding" in the Delaware
statute presents a combination which is well near inclusive of all forms of
litigation. The expression "criminal suit" may be unnatural and awkward"9 but
8. DEL. COD ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1953): "All corporations, whether they
expire by their own limitation or are otherwise dissolved, shall nevertheless be
continued, for the term of three years from such expiration or dissolution, bodies
corporate for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against them,
and of enabling them gradually to settle and close their business, to dispose of
and convey their property, and to divide their capital stock, but not for the
purpose of continuing the business for which the corporation shall have been
established. With respect to any action, suit, or proceeding begun or commenced
by or against the corporation prior to the expiration or dissolution and with
respect to any action, suit or proceeding begun or commenced by or against
the corporation within three years after the date of the expiration or dissolution,
the corporation shall, only for the purpose of such actions, suits or proceedings
so begun or commenced, be continued bodies corporate beyond the three-year
period and until any judgments, orders, or decrees therein shall be fully executed."
9. 202 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953). This case involved the question of a criminal
prosecution of a Delaware corporation which, after indictment, was merged and
dissolved.
10. DnL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 261 (1953). "Any action or proceeding pending
by or against any of the corporations consolidated or merged may be prosecuted
as if such consolidation or merger had not taken place, or the corporation
resulting from or surviving such consolidation or merger may be substituted in
its place."
11. 208 F.2d 936, 40 A.L.R.2d 1389 (7th Cir. 1953). In this case the question
was survival of a criminal proceeding against a Delaware corporation which
dissolved prior to the information being filed.
12. Patterson v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 178 Mich. 288, 144 N.W. 491, 51
L.R.A.(N.S.) 583 (1913) See also State ex rel. Rothwell & Co. Inc. v. Superior
Court for King County, 111 Wash. 63, 189 Pac. 556 (1920), where, in an action
for a writ of prohibition, the court held the words "action, suit or proceeding
commenced and pending" in the code when liberally construed as required by the
code include any proceeding commenced and pending in court which in its proper
disposition calls for the decision of questions of fact, and do not merely contemplate law actions. In United States v. Auervach, 68 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Cal.
1946) it was held that "proceeding" within Price Control Extension Act of 1946
included "criminal prosecution." In Alamo Fence Company v. United States,
240 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1957), it was held that the "power to settle the affairs" of
the corporation and "for this purpose" to "defend judicial proceedings" in a
Texas dissolution statute permitted continuing a criminal prosecution against a
dissolved Texas corporation.
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"criminal proceeding" is a commonplace characterization. The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, it was said", often refer to criminal prosecutions as
"criminal proceedings".
The court in the principal case concludes, somewhat reluctantly, that it will
adhere to its earlier decision in the Safeway case, since the circuits are not
in agreement as to the construction of the Delaware sections. The West Virginia
dissolution section 1 ' is not unlike the Delaware- sections and received the same
construction in the principal case. The Delaware and West Virginia statutes,
as they have been construed, permit the continuation of civil remedies upon merger
and consolidation but do not permit the continuation of criminal prosecutions.
A United States District Court in New York had held" that the words
"action or proceedings then pending" in a section of the New York Stock
Corporation Law 8 which commences with concern for "rights of creditors" and
concludes with a provision for the substitution of the consolidated [new] corporation for any constituent corporation refers to both civil and criminal proceedings.
In this conclusion it was aided by a general construction statute which states:
"... Actions are of two kinds: civil and criminal.". The court in the principal
case also approves of the argument that since it is the policy of New York to
allow the dissolved corporation to pursue its rights and remain suable for its
debts and obligations for a certain period, it is also the public purpose of New
York to allow the community to vindicate any crime the corporation may have
committed prior to dissolution 8 .

13. United States v. P.F. Collier & Son Corporation, supra note 11 at 939.
14. WEST VA. CODE § 3095 (1955).
15. United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Assoc., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 214
(S.D. N.Y. 1955). In this case the issue was survival of a criminal proceeding
against a New York corporation which dissolved as a result of consolidation
after the indictment was returned.
16. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 90 (1951): "The rights of creditors
of any constituent corporation shall not in any manner be impaired, nor shall
any liability or obligation due or to become due, or any claim or demand for any
cause existing against any such corporation or against any stockholder thereof
be released or impaired by any such consolidation; but such consolidated corporation shall be deemed to have assumed and shall be liable for all liabilities and
obligations of each of the corporations consolidated in the same manner as if
such consolidated corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations.
The stockholders of the respective constituent corporations shall continue
subject to all the liabilities, claims and demands existing against them as such,
at or before the consolidation; and no action or proceeding then pending before
any court or tribunal in which any constituent corporation is a party, or in
which any such stockholder is a party, shall abate or be discontinued by reason
of such consolidation, but may be prosecuted to final judgment, as though no
consolidation had been entered into; or such consolidated corporation may be
substituted as a party in place of any constituent corporation, by order of the
court in which such action or proceeding may be pending."
17. N.Y. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11-a (1950).
18. Dialectical definitions which discriminate against the community at large
should not be indulged. Shayne v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 168 N.Y. 70, 61 N.E.
115 (1901) ; Grier v. Kansas City, 286 Mo. 523, 228 S.W. 454 (1921).
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A distinction may be made between merger and consolidation for some
purposes"9 , but for the purpose of survival of criminal prosecutions there should
be little or no distinction.
In Missouri, as in most jurisdictions, the separate existence of all corporation parties to a merger or consolidation, except the surviving or new corporation, ceases. Generally statutes specifically allow the survival of some remedies
after dissolution. Therefore the same basic problem could arise in Missouri
and other jurisdictions and would call for statutory construction of the
pertinent statutes. There are no known Missouri cases deciding the precise
question here involved.
Section 507.100 of the Missouri Revised Statutes"' probably is not applicable
because the judgment will go against "the last board of directors, in a representative capacity, although the members of the board were not joined in the
action"-a result clearly not relevant to a criminal proceeding. Section 351.565"
appears to cover remedies upon which no court action or proceedings have been
instituted at the time of dissolution and is therefore inapplicable to the situation
presented by the principal case. Section 351.450,11 however, is pertinent and
states that "any claim existing or action or proceeding pending by or against
any of such [merged or consolidated] corporations may be prosecuted to judgment as if such merger or consolidation had not taken place." In that respect
it is not unlike section 261 of the Delaware code. "Proceeding" may be broad
enough to include criminal prosecutions; the Delaware statute was so construed

19. Dodier Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club, Inc., 361 Mo.
981, 238 S.W.2d 321 (1951).
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 507.100 (1949). "4. When a corporation has been
sued and served with process or has appeared while in being, and is thereafter
dissolved or its charter forfeited, the action shall not be affected thereby and
any judgment obtained shall have the effect of a judgment against the last
board of directors, in a representative capacity, although the members of the
board were not joined in the action."
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.565 (1949). "The dissolution of a corporation either
by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the secretary of state, or by the
decree of a court of equity when the court has not liquidated the assets and
business of the corporation, or by expiration of its period of duration, shall
not take away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation,
its directors, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability
incurred, prior to such dissolution if suit or other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution. Any such suit or
proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the
corporation in this corporate name."
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.450 (1949). "(5) Such surviving or new corporation shall thenceforth be responsible and liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations so merged or consolidated; and any claim
existing or action or proceeding pending by or against any of such corporations
may be prosecuted to judgment as if such merger or consolidation had not taken
place, or such surviving or new corporation may be substituted in its place.
Neither the rights of creditors nor any liens upon the property of any of such
corporations shall be impaired by such merger or consolidation."

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss2/5
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in the Collier case, but not in the cases from the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. Both
statutes allow the alternative of substituting the new or surviving corporation
in place of the dissolved corporation. The Line Material case said this substitutionary alternative clearly indicated that the Delaware statute included only
civil proceedings. Unlike the Delaware statute, the Missouri statute states that
"any claim existing . . . may be prosecuted to judgment." These additional
words are commonly used when referring to civil proceedings and would seem
to exclude criminal proceedings.
Section 351.450(5) of the Missouri Statutes uses other language fairly referable only to civil proceedings. It states, for example, "neither the rights of
creditors nor any liens . . . shall be impaired by such merger or consolidation."
Again "such surviving or new corporation shall thenceforth be responsible and
liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations so merged
or consolidated." There is the further provision that an "action or proceeding
pending by or against any of such corporations may be prosecuted to judgment
as if such merger or consolidation had not taken place" (a provision similar
to one in the Delaware statute). On the other hand, almost identical language
is found in New York's section 90; yet the New York statute was construed to
allow survival of criminal proceedings.
However, neither Delaware nor Missouri has New York's general construction statute construing "action" to include both civil and criminal proceedings.
ROBERr E. LUSK

FEDERAL TAXATION-NET WORTH COMPUTATION UPON A
FAMILY GROUP BASIS AS A MEANS OF ASCERTAINING NET INCOME
Lias v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
The court in the principal case, involving imposition of a fraud penalty,
decided that net worth computation was properly applied upon a family group
basis as a means to the ascertainment of the taxpayer's net income for income
tax purposes where taxpayer so conducted his affairs and those of a group as
to make it impossible to identify the individual ownership of assets, where the
commissioner established with meticulous detail the computation of the revenue
agents and where the testimony of taxpayer was evasive, contradictory and
unresponsive.
In a typical net worth prosecution, the government, having concluded that
the taxpayer's records are inadequate as a basis of determining income tax
liability, attempts to establish an opening net worth or total net value of the
taxpayer's assets at the beginning of a given year. It then proves increases in

1. 235 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956).
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the taxpayer's net worth for each succeeding year during the period under
examination by calculating the difference between the adjusted net value of the
taxpayer's assets at the beginning and end of the years involved. The taxpayer's non-deductible expenditures, including living expenses, are added to these
increases, and if the resulting figure for any year is substantially greater than
the taxable income reported by the taxpayer for that year, the government
claims the excess represents unreported taxable income. In addition it asks the
jury to infer willfulness from this understatement, when taken in connection
with direct evidence of conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or
to conceal. 2
The net worth computation is closely scrutinized by the courts since there
is a great deal of danger in its use. The danger seems to lie in placing too great
a burden upon the taxpayer and relieving the government of a corresponding
burden. The court in the Holland case' discusses this problem:
While sound administration of the criminal law requires that the net
worth approach-a powerful method of proving otherwise undetectable
offenses-should not be denied the Government, its failure to investigate
leads furnished by the taxpayer might result in serious injustice. It is,
of course, not for us to prescribe investigative procedures, but it is within
the province of the courts to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict. When the Government rests its case solely on the approximations
and circumstantial inferences of a net worth computation, the cogency
of its proof depends upon its effective negation of reasonable explanations
by the taxpayer inconsistent with guilt. Such refutation might fail when
the government does not track down relevant leads furnished by the taxpayer-leads reasonably susceptible of being checked, which, if true, would
establish the taxpayer's innocence. When the Government fails to show
an investigation into the validity of such leads, the trial judge may
consider them as true and the Government's case insufficient to go to the
jury.
The above power in the courts to scrutinize evidence offered by the Government would seem a sufficient safeguard to the taxpayer, without destroying the
potent weapon permitted by the net worth computation in establishing taxable
income from undisclosed sources when all other efforts fail.
The net worth method has some general characteristics that should be noted:
1. Net worth increases must be attributable to taxable income. There must
be evidence supporting the inference that defendant's net worth increases are
attributable to currently taxable income. Proof of a likely source, from which
the jury could reasonably find that the net worth increases sprang, is sufficient.
Any other rule would burden the Government with investigating the many
possible non-taxable sources of income, each of which is as unlikely as it is diffcult
to disprove.

2. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 364 (1943).
3. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 127, 135 (1954).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol22/iss2/5
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2. The burden of proof in a fraud penalty remains on the government. The
Holland case clearly indicates this by stating' "The Government must still prove
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt though not to a mathematical certainty . ..
A final element necessary for conviction is willfulness."
But there can be an inference of willfulness by conduct.
The net worth system was utilized to corroborate direct proof of specific
unreported income in the Capone5 and Guzik' cases.
3. An assumption in the use of the net worth computation is that most assets
are derived from a taxable source. This inference can be rebutted by the
taxpayer.
The use of the net worth method of computation was clearly established by
the Johnson case7 in which the court approved of the use of the net worth theory
to support the inference that the taxpayer, owner of a vast and elaborately concealed network of gambling houses upon which he declared no income, had
indeed received unreported income in a substantial amount. The Holland case
reaffirmed the method. There the Government's opening net worth computation
showed defendants with a net worth of $19,152.59 at the beginning of the indictment period. Shortly thereafter defendants purchased a hotel, bar and restaurant.
Within three years, during which they reported $31,265.92 in taxable income,
their apparent net worth increased by $113,185.32. The Holland case decided
that the Government is not limited to using the net worth theory in a situation
where the taxpayer has no books or where his books are inadequate. It therefore
widened the net worth theory as established by the Johnson case, and now for
the first time, in the Lias case, the court applies the theory to the family group
situation.
In the Lias ease the taxing authorities faced an unusual problem in attempting
to ascertain the accuracy of the petitioner's income tax returns. During the
taxable years involved he received income from five partnerships, in which he
and his brother, John, were partners, and from seven corporations of which
he and members of his family were record owners. The revenue agents ascertained
that the taxpayer carried on many large cash transactions as to which no
records were kept by him. He stated repeatedly to the agents that all assets,
regardless of whether they were in the names of his wife, brother, mother-in-law
or brother-in-law, were his to do with as he saw fit. He was unable to identify
the source of funds used to acquire various assets. He refused to furnish a net
worth statement. Corporate dividends were not paid in accordance with stock
record ownership. Stocks of record were not in the names of the true owners.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 137.
Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931).
Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931).
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
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Bank accounts and assets other than cash were shifted from one name to another.
The Tax Court8 found that "The petitioner so conducted his own affairs and
those of the 'Lias Group' as to make it impossible to identify the individual
ownership of assets." Faced with this situation the revenue agents made a net
worth computation on the Lias family group as a whole. They then allocated
to the wife, brother, and other members of the family the amounts of net income
in which they had paid income tax. The balance of the net income shown by the
net worth computation they allocated to taxpayer. The taxpayer offered no
evidence whatsoever to support his claim that the amount was savings of accumulated cash. The revenue agents, despite detailed search, were unable to uncover any evidence of substantial savings of cash. The taxpayer conclusively
established to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, when his returns for the
years up to 1941 were under consideration, that he had no funds whatsoever.
The court said the determination of what part of the income of the group
is income of the individual is a problem of.presumption and proof. The Tax Court
found that the assets involved belonged to the taxpayer, so the income attributable
to the taxpayer would be that amount of total income remaining after the rest
of the family group's income was determined. An examination of the income
statements of the individuals constituting the family group would indicate the
amount they received. To this point the determination was presumptively
correct.* The matter was then opened wide before the Tax Court. None of the
rest of the family group appeared to claim that their receipts were in excess of
that amount taxed to them. Taxpayer offered no documentary proof, while the
Government produced much proof. On the basis of this the court in the Lids case
said that it could not say that the conclusions of the Tax Court were clearly
erroneous.
The Tax court in its decision which was affirmed by the Lias case stated:"0
While the consolidated family net worth technique does not appear to
have been resorted to heretofore, we think its use is permissible as
embraced within the scope of the net worth technique in civil cases of the
character under consideration and involving the complexities and unprecedented circumstances presented. In our opinion no substantial
injury results to the petitioner. Extraordinary situations require the
adoption of unusual methods to resolve them. Mindful of the pitfalls
inherent in any net worth method, we approve the respondent's use of
the consolidated net worth method in the instant proceedings.
The Tax Court in the above statement aptly expresses the desirability and
necessity for the net worth method of computation, even where applied to a
group situation.
RAYMIoND M. ASHER

8. 24 T.C. 280 (1955).
9. Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938).
10. 24 T.C. 280, 311 (1955).
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-BY ACTION TO COLLECT DEBT
KNOWING OF DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Gore v. Gorenan's Inc.'

This was an action to recover damages, actual and punitive for malicious
prosecution in attempting to enforce the collection of a judgment debt which
had been discharged in bankruptcy. Plaintiff, now a resident of Kansas, owed
defendant $463.46 which was brought to a judgment. Plaintiff filed a petition
in bankruptcy and this judgment was discharged in that proceeding. Defendant
then sought to recover a second judgment on the debt in the justice of peace court
of Wyandotte County, Kansas. Under this suit, "garnishee's summons" was
issued and plaintiff was harassed and forced to retain counsel to obtain a
release. Defendant took all these actions with full knowledge that the judgment
debt was discharged in bankruptcy and now defends solely on the ground that
a discharge was not an extinguishment of the debt but a mere bar to legal
enforcement which is waived unless pleaded. The court rejected this contention,
holding that under the Bankruptcy Act, 11 United States Code Annotated section
35, a discharge "released" the debtor completely, and awarded thirty-five dollars
actual damage and one thousand dollars punitive damages to plaintiff.
The major elements of malicious prosecution are (1) malice and (2) want of
probable cause.' Since malice was apparent, the decision rested on the want of
probable cause, which in turn rests on the nature and effect of a discharge in
bankruptcy.
The courts have uniformly held that a discharge in bankruptcy of the debtor
does not satisfy the debt, but merely releases the legal obligation to pay.' The
moral obligation remains and is sufficient consideration to enforce a new promise
to pay.' It has often been held that the discharge must be pleaded to raise an
effective bar to a subsequent suit. No court but the bankruptcy court is bound
to take notice of the discharge unless it is pleaded.' It appears, then, that the
discharge is a mere bar and not a complete extinguishment of the obligation.
The courts also have held that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to
adjudge the effect of a discharge." In the case of Seaboard Small Loan Co. v.

1. 143 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
2. 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution, § 1.
3. Donnell v. England, 345 Mo. 726, 137 S.W.2d 471 (1940).
4. Davis v. Burke, 188 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App. 1945). The court did say that
the promise had to be express, positive and unconditional.
5. In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. den. 322 U.S. 736 (1944);
Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Hanson, 44 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. App. 1932), cert.
den. 287 U.S. 599 (1932).
6. Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942), 141 A.L.R. 1367 (1942).
7. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. (U.S.) 612 (1849); In Re Weisberg, 253 Fed.
833 (E.D. Mich. 1918); In re De Lauro, 1 F. Supp. 678 (D. Conn. 1932).
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Ottinger8 it was held that a federal district court could issue an injunction against
a state suit on a discharged debt in bankruptcy on the grounds of bill of peace.
Then, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,' it was decided that the bankruptcy court had
ancillary jurisdiction to issue an injunction to preserve the advantages obtained
under a discharge. But the court said, "It does not follow, however, that the
court was bound to exercise its authority and it probably would not and should
not have done so except under unusual circumstances such as exist here."'" The
court left it very unclear as to what constituted "unusual circumstances."" It
has later been held that possible loss of employment because of bother to the
employer through garnishment is such a circumstance. This decision has been
criticized" and, except for one isolated case,"3 severely limited" or distinguished."
Whether the court in the principal case felt that the Local Loan case was
of any value in reaching its decision is questionable. The court seemed to rely
mainly on its own interpretation of the bankruptcy act. The court stated, "If
release doesn't mean what it says then a discharge in bankruptcy becomes a mere
procedural matter and affords little or no protection to one who has availed himself of its provisions."'"
While this decision may be in accord with the true aims of congress in
passing the Bankruptcy Act, it is none the less a clear departure from previous
decisions and should serve as a caveat to those who would attempt to enforce
a debt, discharged in bankruptcy, by legal process.
RALPH H. SMITH, JR.
NEGLIGENCE-ACTION BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND FOR
ANTENUPTIAL PERSONAL TORT
Hamilton v. Fulkerson'
Plaintiff filed a suit for damages for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident as a result of defendant's alleged negligence. Two days
later the parties intermarried. On motion by the defendant the circuit court dis-

8. 50 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1931), 77 A.L.R. 956 (1931).
9. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
10. Supra note 9.
11. In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
12. Note, Effect of Discharge inBankruptcy: Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal
Court, 30 VA.L. Rv.531 (1944).
13. In re Setzler, 73 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
14. In re Barber, 140 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1944).
15. In re Harris, 28 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
16. 143 F. Supp. 9, 12 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
1. 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955), motion for rehearing or to transfer to court
en bane denied Jan. 9, 1956.
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missed the action, and the plaintiff appealed. In this case of first impression
in Missouri it was held that a wife is entitled to maintain an action against her
husband for an antenuptial personal tort resulting from his negligence.2
The supreme court considered as pertinent to these facts section 451.250,
Missouri Revised Statutes (1949). It provides:
"..

. any personal property, including rights in action, belonging to

any woman at her marriage . . . shall . . . be and remain her separate
property and under her sole control, . . . and any such married woman

may, in her own name and without joining her husband, as a party plaintiff institute and maintain any action in any of the courts of this state
having jurisdiction, for the recovery of any such personal property,
including rights in action as aforesaid, with the same force and effect as
if such married woman was a femme sole; . . ."

The court had little difficulty in holding under this statute that the cause
of action for the personal tort, belonging to the plaintiff while single, remained
as her separate property as a right in action after marriage.'
While the rule of common law prohibited suits between spouses, the Married
Woman's Acts have allowed the wife to sue in her own name and alone for
injuries done to her property or person by a stranger. Where the tortious
conduct has been that of the husband, most jurisdictions allow the wife to re-

2. The right of a wife to sue her husband for a personal tort committed
during coverture is closely related, and most, if not all of the arguments for
and against the existence of that right apply to the right under discussion.
While distinguished, the two rights have not generally been given separate
treatment either by the courts or the writers on the subject. Any right in the
wife to maintain such an action springs from the interpretation given to the
various "Married Woman's Acts", but the majority of American jurisdictions
have refused to give such an interpretation and continue to follow the common
law rule prohibiting suits between spouses. For a general discussion see; Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF. L. Rnv. 461,
471-80 (1922); Farage, Recovery for Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290
(1935); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L.
Riv. 1030, 1041-56 (1930); Anno. in 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
3. The general provisions of Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.250 (1949), were enacted
by Mo. LAWS 1875, p. 61. An amendment of 1883 added the provisions giving
the wife the right to sue in her own name for her personal property and rights
in action.
4. Those minority jurisdictions allowing recovery by a wife for personal
torts committed by the husband during coverture of course allow recovery for
his antenuptial torts. While generally the jurisdictions prohibiting actions
between spouses have not distinguished antenuptial torts, at least two other
courts to date have reached the same result as the Missouri court: Curtis v.
Wilcox, [1948] 2 K.B. 478, [1948] 2 All Eng. 573, overruled Gottiffe v. Edelston,
[1930] 2 K.B. 378; Carver v. Ferguson, 254 P.2d 44 (Cal. App. 1953) (allowed
wife to recover for the antenuptial tort, holding that the cause of action remained her separate property. The California Supreme Court granted hearing,
and thereafter the action was dismissed which by Calfornia law nullified the
effect of the case as authority).
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cover for the injuries to her property but do not for injuries to her person.' A
growing minority of states, however, have interpreted these Acts as allowing the
wife an action against her husband even for the personal tort.' Missouri was
committed to the more general rule by the decision in Rogers v. Rogers,, followed
in all respects by Willott v. Willott.0 Those cases, however, involved torts
committed by the husband upon the wife during coverture and, as the Willott
case points out, were not concerned with the statute relating to the wife's separate
property rights.9
The factual distinction between an antenuptial tort and one committed
during coverture is obvious enough, but whether or not this distinction should
determine the absence or presence of a legal right after the parties intermarry
would seem to depend upon the theory behind the common law prohibition of suits
between spouses as applied by Missouri courts. At common law the husband and
wife were one. 0 This doctrine had the effect not only of prohibiting the wife
to sue alone, but there could be no tort committed between spouses who were
legally one." An old argument against the wife's right of action, but one which
has had an effective revival, is that of public policy. 2
The reasons usually assigned to support the public policy argument are that
such actions between spouses would disturb domestic tranquillity; tend to cause
marital discord and divorce; cause fictitious, collusive, and fraudulent claims;
cause a rise in liability insurance rates; and promote trivial actions. It has also
been contended that a spouse has adequate remedy for civil wrongs inflicted by
the other spouse through the criminal and divorce courts.
As the tort in the principal case was committed before coverture there
could be no defense of legal identity, and by the holding that the cause of action

5. PROSSER ON TORTS 672 (2d ed. 1955); 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife
§ 395. Oregon now allows recovery for intentional torts committed on the wife by
the husband, but does not for negligent torts: Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242,
287 P.2d 585 (1956) (intentional tort); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d
572 (1956) (negligent tort).
6. PROSSER ON TORTS 673 (2d ed. 1955); Albertsworth, Recognition of New
Interestsin the law of Torts, supra note 2; Anno. in 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955).
7. 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915) (action by wife against husband for
false imprisonment).
8. 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084, 89 A.L.R. 114 (1933) (action by wife
against husband for injury from husband's negligent operation of automobile).
9. Id. at 898. Considering the interpretation given Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.250
(1949) in the noted case, we may ask what effect, if any, will it have on the law
of the Willott decision. The statute reads: ". . . any personal property,
including rights in action, belonging to any woman at her marriage, or which
. . . has grown out of any violation of her personal rights, shall . . . be and
remain her separate property. . . ." (Emphasis added).
10. PROSSER ON TORTS 670 (2d ed. 1955).
11. Phillips v. Barnet, [1876] 1 Q.B.D. 436; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24
Am. Rep. 27 (1877).
12. Ibid; PROSSER ON TORTS 674 (2d ed. 1955); Rogers v. Rogers, slupra note
7; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
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in the wife remained her separate property after marriage, the procedural difficulty was overcome." The argument that to allow such an action would be
contrary to public policy would still apply if valid. The court in its discussion
of the Rogers and Wi/lott cases concluded that this last mentioned argument
was the rationale of the present Missouri rule against actions between spouses
for personal torts. Similarly, it interpreted the cases of other jurisdictions which
apply this prohibition to suits involving antenuptial torts as being based upon the
same argument.
But in Missouri a wife can sue her husband's employer for her personal
injuries sustained on account of the husband's negligenee while acting in the
scope of his employment, even though the employer may in turn recover over
against the husband.1 ' Thus, she can do indirectly what she cannot do directly.
The court reasoned that there would be the same considerations of public
policy in such an action, and in the words of the court ". . clearly indicates
that . . . there were no considerations of public policy weighty enough to prohibit a wife's suit against her husband for a personal tort even though committed
during marriage."1 The court thus overcame to its own satisfaction the public
policy argument in general.
Such aspects of the argument as disruption of the domestic tranquillity
would seem to lose their forcefulness in view of the actions allowed between
spouses based upon wrongful acts affecting their separate property. There would
appear to be little tranquillity left at the time of suit anyhow, except that usually
in a negligence case the husband's insurance company is the real party in
interest.'
This is obviously true in the principal case as any real hostility
between the spouses as a result of the tort would appear unlikely in view of the
later marriage. Here the court concluded that the cost of liability insurance
should not determine the presence of a legal right. It also pointed out the fact
that because an injured spouse only has recourse to the criminal and divorce
courts is but to show that for this type injury there is no remedy.
A question is raised by the present holding concerning the husband's
reciprocal right to recover. Considering that the court bases the decision on
purely statutory grounds, it would seem that in absence of statute there can be

13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.250 (1949) (allowing wife to sue as femme sole for
injury to her separate property).
14. Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S.W.2d 645
(1936); Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 231 Mo. App. 276, 96 S.W.2d 1082 (1936);
accord, Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42
(1928); Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N.E.2d 597 (1952).
15. 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955).
16. No wife would want to sue her husband for a negligent tort except as
a "raid on an insurance company." Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196
N.Y.Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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no similar right in the husband."
While the opinion in the instant case expressly stated that the court gave no
opinion on the validity of the law established in the Rogers and Willott cases, 8
there are indications that inroads may have been made upon that doctrine. The
public policy argument upon which those decisions seem to rest was seriously
questioned, and the court states that the contrary interpretation of the statute
involved would have been "possible and plausible". In speculating on what
position the court will take when the situation involved in those cases again
comes before it, the pragmatical attitude shown in the principal case may offer
some insight. However, the doctrines of stare decisis and judicial legislation
may prove formidable, and the possible anomaly concerning the husband's reciprocal right will surely be considered.
LARY DAVIS
NEGLIGENCF-DEATH OF APARTMENT TENANT AT HANDS OF
PAINTER-LIABILITY OF LANDLORD FOR FAILURE TO
INVESTIGATE EMPLOYEE
Kendall v. Gore Properties'
A corporate landlord, through its manager, hired a painter to paint the
interior of decedent's apartment. The painter strangled the decedent. An action
for wrongful death was brought by decedent's administratrix who charged that
Gore Properties and its manager were negligent in hiring a painter and then
assigning and allowing that painter to enter and paint, without supervision or
control, after regular working hours, the apartment of decedent who was a single
woman living alone in Washington, D.C., without making an investigation,
obtaining references or having previous experience with the painter. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the trial court's directed
verdict for defendants and held that a prima facie case of negligence had been

17. North Carolina holds that the "Married Woman's Acts" have abrogated
the wife's common law disability to sue, but denies a similar right to the
husband, holding that his disability still obtained, and removal was a matter
for the legislature. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949);
accord: Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16
N.W.2d 787 (1944). But see Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51, 158 S.E. 840 (1931),
allowing husband to recover from his wife for her antenuptial tort on basis of
statute to the effect that a woman's liability for her torts was not affected by
her marriage, and Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957) for a novel case
in which the husband was held to have a good cause of action against his wife for
a postnuptial negligent tort on basis of statute removing wife's common law
disability to be sued alone.
18. Supra notes 7 and 8.
1. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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made out on the aspect of disregarding the elementary precautions of making an
inquiry concerning an employee who is to work in occupied apartments and
then allowing that employee to work without supervision in the leased premises
of an unprotected tenant.
The theory of the case was not that of "respondeat superior" where a master
is generally not liable for the crimes or intentional torts of his servant acting
outside the scope of the employment, unless the crime by the servant is in
itself a violation of a duty assumed by the master toward the person injured, such
as a bailment situation. Rather, the theory was that the landlord itself had
breached a duty owed by the landlord to the decedent which was the proximate
cause of the death and that the criminal act was not an efficient intervening or
superseding cause.
Ordinarily, there is no general duty to act for the protection of others', but
often, because of a particular social relationship, the law imposes a duty to
refrain from negligent conduct which would facilitate injury to a person or
property as a result of a criminal act by a third person. Some of these relationships are common carrier and passenger7 , innkeeper and guest8 , banker and

2. Rohrmoser v. Household Finance Corp., 231 Mo. App. 1188, 86 S.W. 2d
103 (1935). An employee of the defendant loan corporation went to the female
plaintiff's apartment to collect on a loan, then assaulted plaintiff and tore her
dress. The court held these acts were not within the scope of employment and
the loan corporation was not liable.
3. In Bowles v. Payne, 251 S.W. 101 (Mo. App. 1923), the defendant was
the bailee of plaintiff's goods when the goods were stolen by servants of the
defendant. The defendant was held liable.
4. Daneschocky v. Sieble, 195 Mo. App. 470, 193 S.W. 966 (1917). A contractor had placed building materials on the sidewalk and out into the street
forcing pedestrians to walk around them and into the street. The contractor
was held liable for injuries to a pedestrian run down by a reckless motorist
who was breaking the speed limit. See Annotation 78 A.L.R. 480 (1932).
5. 2 RESTATEMENT o' ToRTs § 314 (1936).
6. Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YAI
L.J. 886, 887 (1934).
7. Baker v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 158 S.W. 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), 78
A.L.R. 482 (1913). Defendant railway was negligent for allowing white men in
colored car on train and that this was the proximate cause of assault on plaintiff's wife by white man; Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S.E. 690 (1921),
defendant railway was held liable for damages to female plaintiff who was carried
past her station then let off to walk back but was assaulted and raped while
walking back; but see Sira v. Wabash Ry. Co., 115 Mo. 127, 21 S. W. 905 (1893),
where the railway was not liable for similar consequences when it let off female
passenger at preceding station to await train which would stop at her station.
8. Overstreet v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 72 (1901), hotel proprietor held
liable for assault on guest by servant.
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customer' and sheriff and prisoner"0 . However, the landlord was not the
guarantor of the safety of its tenants 1 but did have a duty not to hire or retain
employees which it knew or should have known, in the exercise of ordinary care,
were unworthy of the trust which was placed in them".
In the principal case, where the decision was based on the defendant's
failure to make a reasonable investigation of the painter or have him employed
sufficiently long to merit the trust placed in him, the court said that decedent
was entitled to assume the defendants would not assign a person to work after
hours in her apartment without supervision when they had failed to exercise
any care in ascertaining the trustworthiness of such person.
The decision appears to mark at least some extension to the limits of
liability in this particular field. Prior to the principal case it had usually been
stated that it was necessary to establish and show both a duty to investigate and
also that a reasonable investigation would have disclosed sufficient facts to
put the defendant on notice of dangerous, dishonest or criminal propensities in
the person employed before liability would be attached". In this case the last

9. Nelson v. Union Bank, 33 Manitoba L.R. 508, 13 B.R.C. 329 (1923),
bank failed to make inquiry if negotiable wheat certificates had been received
for seven weeks. They were stolen but bank held liable as loss to holder was
occasioned by bank's negligence.
10. Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (5th Cir. 1892). Action for permitting
prisoner to be killed by a mob.
11. Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co. Inc., 112 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
12. Priest v. F.W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. App. 23,
62 S.W. 2d 926, 23 A.L.R. 2d 390 (1933), where the assistant store manager of
defendant injured a customer by bending her backward over a counter while
engaged in horseplay. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff as this
was not within the scope of employment, but stated that the action could have
been founded upon employer's failure to exercise ordinary care in employing
proper servants; Smothers v. Welch & Company House Furnishing Company,
310 Mo. 144, 274 S.W. 678, 40 A.L.R. 1209 (1925), furniture dealer held not
liable for indecent assault upon lady customer by salesman in remote part of
building but still owes duty of ordinary care to employ competent and law abiding
servants; Hall v. Smathers, 240 N.Y. 486, 148 N.E. 654 (1925), landlord who
knowingly kept an incompetent and dangerous janitor was held liable for
janitor's assault upon a tenant who rightfully went to the basement to feed
some cats kept on the premises; Rhodes v. Warsawsky, 242 Ill. App. 101 (1926);
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToTs, 248, 249; 1 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY
§ 213d (1933).
13. Porter v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 31, 206 S.W.2d 509 (1947), where a private
watchman employed by defendant shot plaintiff's husband out of jealousy in a
restaurant where watchman went during working hours in violation of duties.
Court said a showing .that the watchman had vicious propensities was not
enough. The plaintiff also had to show that the master knew or should have known
of these propensities and since there was not substantial evidence on this the
demurrer should have been sustained; Arp v. Rogers, 99 S.W.2d 103 (1936);
Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 104 A.2d 407 (D.C. 1954), defendant's deliveryman assaulted a housewife. The court held the master not liable for negligence
in selection as there was no evidence that investigation would have uncovered
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step was eliminated and the landlord was still found to be liable.
The case of Argonne Apartment House Co. v. Garrison" was distinguished
on the grounds that in that case there were written references required although
unchecked and that the employee had been assigned to work as an electrician's
helper under an old and trusted employee. The court labeled as dictum the
liability limiting statement in the Argonne case that it was not sufficiently shown
that investigation would have disclosed sufficient facts to put owner on notice
of employee's dishonesty.
The court rationalizes its departure from the more usual limits of liability
with a statement to the effect that if the landlord may fail to make even a cursory
inquiry and be allowed to excuse itself in its own ignorance then its own
recklessness would be exalted. The court believed this would place a premium
upon a wilful refusal to make an elementary inquiry into the habits, tendencies
and work experience of employees of landlords.
ROBERT E. LUsK

NEGLIGENCE-MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO
PERSONS WITH PECULIAR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SUBSTANCE
IN PRODUCT
Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corporation'
Plaintiff brought an action for injuries to her optic nerve suffered after using
defendant's home permanent wave lotion. After the jury had answered interrogatories favorably to the plaintiff, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma, sustained defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's
answers to those interrogatories. The substance of the answers was: that the
plaintiff was injured as a direct and proximate result of using the defendant's
product; that the substance known as ammonium thioglycolate contained in
defendant's product was dangerous and injurious to the health of those who use
it; and that the defendant had knowledge of the dangerous and injurious

facts to put master on notice; LaLone v. Smith, 39 Wash.2d 167, 234 P.2d
893 (1951); F. & L. Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Jomark Inc. 134 Misc. 349, 235 N.Y.S. 551
(1929); 1 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 213d (1933); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF TORTS, pp. 366, 367.
14. 42 F. 2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1930). The apartment house owner was not held
liable for the theft of jewelry by an employee from a tenant.
1. For an excellent article on the medico-legal aspects of allergies, see
Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based Upon Breach of
Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. CALIF. L. Rxv. 221 (1951); see also,
Comment, 49 MIcH. L. RLV. 253 (1951); Anno. 26 A.L.R.2d 963.
2. 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
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qualities of the product. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff
did not have a cause of action against the manufacturer in view of proof that
her injury was an isolated instance of injury to an unusually susceptible individual, in that over 500,000,000 similar products had been sold with only very rare
ill effects. The court also held that a manufacturer who places his product on the
market, knowing that some unknown few, not in an identifiable class which could
be effectively warned, may suffer allergic reactions or other isolated injuries
not common to ordinary or normal persons, need not respond in damages to such
persons, saying that warranties do not extend to injuries caused by peculiar
idiosyncrasies or physical condition of a user which are not reasonably foreseeable
because the rule as to negligence in such cases applies to warranties.
The court in so holding applied what is apparently the majority rule where
the injured party suffers injury as a result of his peculiar sensitivity, idiosyncrasy, or allergic condition.' Other courts have held that the mere fact that only
a small proportion of those who use the product will be affected does not relieve
the manufacturer of liability,' and the Massachusetts courts and Missouri have
held that where the substance contained in the product is somewhat harmful to
normal persons, the mere fact that the injured party's physical condition contributes to the extent or seriousness of the injury does not relieve the manufacturer of liability.'
The result reached by the majority of courts has been the same whether the
action was brought on the theory of breach of implied warranty or on the
negligence theory. The cases tried on the theory of breach of implied warranty
are apparently based upon the proposition that the implied warranty of fitness

3. Zager v. F.W. Woolworth, 30 Cal.App.2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939)
(freckle cream); Stanton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 Il1. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d
801 (1942); Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 76 N.E.2d 404 (1946)
(cold cream); Longo v. Tourain Stores, 319 Mass. 727, 66 N.E.2d 792 (1946)
(gloves); Payne v. R.H. White Co., 314 Mass. 63, 49 N.E.2d 425 (1943) (dress);
Bradt v. Holloway, 242 Mass. 446, 136 N.E. 254 (1922) (scarf); Ross v.
Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650 (1939) (dress);
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Drug Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955) (hair
rinse); Barrett v. S.S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941)
(dress); Levi v. Colgate-Palmolive Proprietary Ltd., 41 New So. W. St. 48, 58
New So. W. 63 (1941) (bath salts).
4. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.App.2d 157, 268
P.2d 199 (1954) (dictum); Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 312 Mass. 469, 19
N.E.2d 967, 121 A.L.R. 460 (1939) (face powder); Brown v. Sehler Co., 177
Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913) (coat) action against jobber; Schilling v. Roux
Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953) (hair dye); Reynolds v.
Sun Ray Drug Co., 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A.2d 666 (1947) (lipstick); Zirpola v. Adam
Hat Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (1939) (hat).
5. Evinger v. Thompson, 364 Mo. 658, 265 S.W.2d 726 (1954); Smith v.
Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N.E. 631 (1934).
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extends only to normal use by a normal person.' Those tried on the theory of
negligence turn on the actual knowledge of the manufacturer that there is a risk
of injury to the user.' While some courts have held that knowledge that the
substance may be harmful to "some" persons, even though the number be small,
is sufficient,' the majority have emphasized the "dangerous character" of the
substance and held that if the manufactured article was incapable of injuring
the ordinary, normal person, the manufacturer or jobber owes no duty to warn
the abnormally susceptible user.'
The question of whether the plaintiff is an ususually susceptible person,
and thus without remedy, has also received varying treatment. While some courts
have held that the presence of an allergy or unusual susceptibility is a matter
of defense only and that in the absence of proof to the contrary the jury may consider him normal,'0 probably a greater number of courts have held that the
plaintiff must show that he is a normal person in order to bring himself within
the class of people to whom the warranty or duty to warn extends. 1
The cases in Missouri involving allergy or peculiar susceptibility are somewhat in conflict. The present status of the law in regard to cases brought on the
theory of breach of implied warranty seems to be in line with the case herein
noted and the majority rule, while the cases tried on the negligence theory would
seem to be more in line with the minority. A short survey of the Missouri cases
is here presented in order that the reader may make his own analysis of them."
Marra v. Jones Store Company" involved an action by the purchaser of a
blouse against the retailer for dermatitis allegedly contracted from some

6. Worley v. Proctor & Gamble, 253 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1952); Ross v.
Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., supra note 3, and cases generally in note 3,
supra.
7. Briggs v. National Industries, 92 Cal.App.2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949);
Gould v. Slater Woolen Co., 147 Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888).
8. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 4; Brown v.
Sehler Co., supra,note 4.
9. Levi v. Colgate-Palmolive Proprietary Ltd., 41 New So. W. St. 48, 58
New So. W. 63 (1941); Briggs v. National Industries, supra note 7.
10. Marra v. Jones Store Co., 170 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. App. 1943); Payne v.
R.H. White Co., 314 Mass. 63, 49 N.E.2d 425 (1943); Zager v. F.W. Woolworth
Co., 30 Cal.App.2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (1939).
11. Worley v. Proctor & Gamble, 253 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1952); Flynn
v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass. 450, 136 N.E. 252 (1922); Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co.,
319 Mass. 690, 76 N.E.2d 404 (1946); Longo v. Touraine Stores, 319 Mass. 727,
66 N.E.2d 792 (1946); Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell & Braun Co., 136 Me. 118, 3
A.2d 650 (1939); Cleary v. John M. Mars Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
12. On implied warranties in Missouri in general, see Overstreet, Some
Aspects of Implied Warrantiesin the Supreme Court of Missouri, 10 Mo. L. Ruv.
147 (1945). This article contains an interesting analysis of the cases cited in
notes 13 and 14, infra.
13. 170 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. App. 1943).
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poisonous substance in the blouse. The case was tried on a breach of warranty
theory and the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed recovery by the plaintiff
although there was no direct evidence to prove any poisonous or irritating substance was contained in the blouse at the time of the sale. The court held that
the seller's want of actual knowledge of the injurious substance was immaterial
even though it could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection, but indicated that proof of allergy might have been a defense if shown by the defendant.
State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shaii1 ' quashed the opinion in the Marra
case on the ground that it was in conflict with the previous supreme court
decisions holding that a retailer was liable on the breach of warranty theory
only when he knew that the purchaser was buying for a particular use, otherwise the rule of caveat emptor applied unless the defect was discoverable by
reasonable inspection. While this holding applied only as to retailers, the
language and reasoning in the Marraopinion might still be of value in an action
against a manufacturer.
The case of Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co." is the most recent
Missouri decision involving breach of warranty. In that case the St. Louis Court
of Appeals held that the scope of the warranty in question was limited to absence
of ingredients injurious to the skin of a normal person using detergent in a
normal manner, and that the burden was on the consumer to show that she was
such a person and that it was injurous to her skin. This holding is directly in
line with the majority rule.
In the negligence field only two cases have been found, neither of which
involve a suit against a manufacturer. However, since the underlying principles
are still applicable they are worthy of noting. The case of Arnold v. May Dept.
Stores Co.18 involved an action by a patron against the operator of a beauty
shop for dermatitis allegedly caused by application of a hair dye to which she
was sensitized or allergic. The plaintiff had previously suffered injury from
application of a hair dye some ten years earlier and she informed the operator
of that fact. The operator applied the solution without testing or further
investigation and the plaintiff suffered serious injury. The court held that the
operator knew, or should have known, of her condition and could have foreseen
the possible effects, therefore, negligence was properly proved. On these facts,
the case is not contra to the majority rule since the defendant had notice that
this particular plaintiff was susceptible.
The case of Evinger v. Thompson 7 is somewhat more in point although it is
an action by an employee against his employer under the Federal Employer's

14.
15.
16.
17.

State ex rel. Jones Store v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944).
Supra note 6.
Arnold v. May Dept. Stores Co., 337 Mo. 727, 85 S.W.2d 748 (1935).
364 Mo. 658, 265 S.W.2d 726 (1954).
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Liability Act. Here the plaintiff contracted dermatitis from working with a rust
inhibitor containing a chrome compound. The court held that while it was not
common knowledge that the rust inhibitor contained harmful chemicals, that it
was a question for the jury whether the employer had knowledge, actual or constructive, of its harmful character, although the burden of proof was on the
plaintiff. The court further held that the question of allergy was also for the
jury and that if it is shown that a considerable number may be affected by the
chemical in the inhibitor, recovery would not be denied because of the plaintiff's peculiar susceptibility. On the latter point the court seems to be nearer
the minority view by recognizing that even though the substance might not be
injurious to the "normal" person, there may still be liability if "some" persons
are liable to suffer injury.
While the case noted herein is sound in light of present legal authority,
medical advances in regard to allergies are quite likely to increase the volume
of litigation in this field which in turn may lead to a change in the attitude
of the courts. In view of the present uncertainty in the Missouri decisions, it is
submitted that, if presented in a proper case, the Missouri Supreme Court still
has a freedom of choice as to which rule it will follow, the minority rule toward
stricter liability, or the present majority rule as represented by this case.
DWIGHT L. LARIsON

REAL PROPERTY-COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LANDSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON ACTION FOR BREACH OF
RESTRICTION
McLaughlin v. Neiger1
By instruments dated 1921 and 1934, the several lots in a subdivision were
effectively restricted so that no business could be carried on in any building. It
was further provided that the restrictions would constitute a binding contract
among* all lot owners, their successors in interest, and any persons holding
under either of them. The instruments also contained a provision that the
restrictions would constitute covenants attached to and running with the land.
This action was brought by the owner of one of the lots to enforce, by way
of injunction, the restrictive covenant as against a nursery school operated for
profit on one of the restricted lots. Plaintiffs alleged they learned of the breach
in 1952.
In the trial court, the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the
action was barred by the five year statute of limitations on personal actions,

1. 286 S.W.2d 380 (Mo. App. 1956).
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section 516.120, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949).2 This claim was based on
an allegation of open and continuous operation of the nursery school since 1946.
The defendant's theory was that the plaintiffs were here attempting to enforce
a contract right.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claimed that this action was controlled by
one of two ten year statutes of limitation, section 516.010, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1949), the ten year bar on real actions, or section 516.110, Missouri
Revised Statutes (1949), the ten year bar on personal actions,' apparently
basing their strongest claim on the assertion that the restrictive covenant
created a property right in the lot owners which could be included under "lands,
tenements, or hereditaments" as covered by section 516.010.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground,
among others, that the five year statute of limitations on personal actions, section 516.120, was applicable. The plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme Court of
Missouri was transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which reversed and
remanded the case. The court assumed, for the purposes of the appeal, that there
had been open and continuous violation of the restrictive covenant since 1946.
The court decided that section 516.010, the ten year statute on real actions, was
applicable on the following line of reasoning:
First, the court stated that restrictive covenants of this type run with the
land, thus creating a duty of the holder of the land to conform to the covenant,
although he did not personally sign it.
Next, the court held that valid restrictive covenants create an easement
appurtenant to the land, and therefore the owner of each lot had an easement
in each and all of the lots affected by the restrictions.
The court concluded by finding that this easement appurtenant to the land
constituted an hereditament. This was arrived at by finding that these easements
had two characteristics of hereditaments. First, this was a right growing out of,
or appurtenant to real property, and second, it could be inherited along with the
land. Therefore, since this was an hereditament which plaintiff was attempting
to recover, the action was governed by section 516.010, the ten year statute of
limitations on real actions.

2. Section 516.120 provides: "Within five years: (1) All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied, except those mentioned in
section 516.110, and except upon judgments or decrees of a court of record, and
except where a different time is herein limited; . . ."
3. Section 516.010 provides: "No action for the recovery of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be
commenced, had or maintained by any person . . . unless it appears that the
plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, grantor or other person under whom he
claims was seized or possessed of the premises in question, within ten years
before the commencement of such action." Section 516.110 provides: "Within ten
years: . . . (3) Actions for relief, not herein otherwise provided for."
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Under this finding the court did not discuss whether or not the ten year statute
of limitations on personal actions, section 516.110, was applicable.
This is apparently a case of first impression in Missouri. There have been
several cases where violations of restrictive covenants have been considered,
but any lapse of time before suit was usually considered in connection with
whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of laches, waiver, or abandonment.'
Seemingly, there was no argument of laches in this case, probably because plaintiff did not actually know of the violations until long after their beginning. Of
course, it is well settled in Missouri that the statutes of limitation apply to
equitable actions as well as legal actions.'
It is difficult to compare decisions of other jurisdictions in a statutory interpretation of this type. However, almost all decisions on cases of this type
were decided on the question of laches, waiver, or abandonment.7 One Oregon
case' was found where a building line restriction was held to be an easement
subject to the state's real property statute of limitations (which was similar to
Missouri's).
The St. Louis Court of Appeals' reasoning seems to be supported by authority
both in Missouri and other jurisdictions. The weight of authority seems to
hold that restrictive covenants of this type run with the land, even without an
express declaration to that effect (which was contained in this covenant).'
Applying any of the tests used by text writers and courts, (especially the timehonored criterion of "intention") there seems to be little doubt that this covenant
restriction runs with the land.
As to the court's declaration that the restrictive covenant created an easement
in all of the lots, there is a contrary view in some jurisdictions. 10 These decisions
hold that restrictive covenants of this type merely create contract rights in the
parties. However, the more widely followed rule and the rule as laid down in

4. Hall v. Koehler, 347 Mo. 658, 148 S.W.2d 489 (1941) ; Pierce v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 311 Mo. 262, 278 S.W. 398 (1925); Miller v. Klein, 177 Mo.
App. 557, 160 S.W. 562 (1913).
5. As an example, if a property owner knowingly sits by, does nothing, and
allows another property owner to erect a $100,000 business building on land
restricted to residential buildings, he forthwith would be estopped from asserting
his rights under the restriction.
6. Campbell v. Webb, 363 Mo. 1192, 258 S.W.2d 595 (1953); Branner v.
Klaber, 330 Mo. 306, 49 S.W.2d 169 (1932).
7. See generally, Moore v. Adams, 200 Ark. 810, 141 S.W.2d 46 (1940);
Hoffman v. Schwan, 312 Ill. App. 160, 38 N.E.2d 53 (1941).
8. De Martini v. Hayhurst, 154 Ore. 663, 62 P.2d 1 (1936).
9. Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 415 (Mo. 1955); 26
C.J.S. Deeds § 167 (1).
10. 14 Am. JUR. Covenants, Conditions and Rest7ictions § 193.
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numerous Missouri cases is that the interests actually created are easements,
i.e. property rights."
Once the court found that an easement was created, it seems clear that there
would be little difficulty in finding that the plaintiff was attempting to recover
an hereditament. The cases and authorities cited by the court in the opinion to
support this contention show the abundance of authority to the effect that easements appurtenant to real property and capable of being inherited are hereditaments.'2
Therefore, it appears that the court was clearly right in determining that
restrictive covenants of the type in the principal case are controlled by the real
property statute of limitations, section 516.010. Even though it is now settled
that a ten year statute of limitations applies, it is probable that most cases of this
type in the future will continue to be argued on a laches, waiver, or abandonment
issue, in order to reduce substantially the ten year period.

WMrIAM 0. WELMAN

11. The leading Missouri case is Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W.
1024 (1921). See also, State ex rel. Britton v. Mulloy, 332 Mo. 1107, 61 S.W.2d
741 (1933); Matthews v. First Christian Church of St. Louis, 355 Mo. 627, 197
S.W.2d 617 (1946); 14 Am. JUn. Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 193.
These easements are sometimes called negative easements, negative equitable
easements, or servitudes.
12. Also see Hickey v. Danna, 238 Mo. App. 839, 187 S.W.2d 764 (1945).
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